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Abstract 
Quantifying the effects of trade policy in the age of ’global value chains’ (GVCs) requires an 
enhanced analytical framework that takes the observed international input-output relations in due 
account. However, existing quantitative general equilibrium models generally assume that industry-
level bilateral final and intermediate trade shares are identical, and that the allocation of imported 
inputs across sectors is the same as the allocation of domestic inputs. This amounts to applying two 
proportionality assumptions, one at the border to split final goods and inputs, and another behind the 
border to allocate inputs across industries. In practice, neither assumption holds in available input-
output data sets. To overcome this limitation of existing models, we consider a richer input-output 
structure across countries and sectors that we can match with the actual structure reported in input-
output tables. This allows us to investigate the relation between the effects of changes in trade policies 
and GVCs. When we apply the enhanced quantitative general equilibrium model to the assessment of 
the effects of Brexit, we find trade and welfare losses that are substantially larger than those obtained 
by previous models. This is due to the close integration of UK-EU production networks and implies 
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Non-technical summary
After decades of significant steps towards trade integration at the international level, global trade
has been expanding at a slower pace since the Great Recession. At the same time, public opinion
and policymakers have started questioning the benefits of free trade. The UK has made the deci-
sion to leave the European Union, the US has experienced a return to protectionism while trade
barriers have been rising substantially in recent years both in advanced and developing economies
contributing to the weakening of global trade. Rising trade barriers have consequences for prices
and economic activity. To the extent that higher tariff and non-tariff barriers pass through to
the prices of intermediate and final products, higher trade costs can raise consumer prices. This
may reduce consumption and investment, weigh negatively on economic activity and ultimately
reduce welfare. In the long term, allocative inefficiencies due to relative price distortions could
further harm welfare through lower productivity and potential growth.
While the quantification of the impact of trade policy on prices, economic activity and welfare
has always been at the core of trade policy analysis, the complexity of today’s trade relations
raises new unprecedented challenges. In particular, the rise of ’global value chains’ (GVCs),
through which production processes are organized in multiple stages across several countries,
requires the adoption of enhanced analytical frameworks that take the observed international
input-output relations in due account.
The aim of this paper is to propose one such framework and show how it can be operational-
ized for quantitative trade policy analysis. In doing so, we first investigate a simple thought
experiment that highlights the importance of allowing for a detailed characterization of GVCs
in quantifying the effects of trade policy shocks. The experiment compares the welfare effects
of a uniform increase in trade costs across the world in two scenarios that differ in terms of
the salience of GVCs. We then apply the proposed framework to the quantitative analysis of
the most important trade policy shock currently affecting the European Union: the impending
departure of the UK (a.k.a. ’Brexit’).
Specifically, we adopt a general equilibrium multi-sector Ricardian trade model of the global
economy with trade in both final and intermediate products. By mapping bilateral supply chain
linkages and value-added flows, the model provides a rich framework that captures countries’
heterogeneity in terms of the composition of their trade flows as well as in terms of their involve-
ment in GVCs. We use the model to understand how cross-border multi-stage production affects
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the transmission of trade policy shocks to national welfare. The model is rich enough to predict
the impact of trade shocks on each sector within each country for both goods and services. The
main caveat is that being based on comparative statics, the model’s predictions do not include
dynamic effects, such as the short-run effects of increased uncertainty and the transition to a
new equilibrium as well as the long-run effects on productivity and growth, unemployment and
migration.
In the simple thought experiment, we highlight the crucial role of GVCs in the transmission of
trade policy shocks by considering the effects of a uniform 40% increase in trade barriers in all
sectors across all world countries and comparing the model’s predictions in two scenarios. In the
first, we assume the input-output structure observed in 2000. In the second, we assume instead
the input-output structure observed in 2014 when GVCs are much more salient. This exercise
shows that the negative impact of a 40% increase in trade costs on countries’ welfare (measured
as real household income) is on average 36% larger in absolute value in 2014 than in 2000, and as
much as 219% larger for some countries. Hence, denser GVCs act as an amplifier of the adverse
welfare effects of protectionist trade policies.
In the Brexit application, we present results for alternative trade policy scenarios ranging from
a EU-UK free trade agreement (FTA) and a reversal to the most favoured nation (MFN) terms
prescribed by the WTO in case of ‘no deal’. We consider also a variation on the MFN scenario
following the schedule of tariffs announced by the UK in March 2019 that involves a drastic and
unilateral reduction by the UK of its MFN import tariffs (New MFN scenario). We conclude that
properly accounting for GVCs makes a substantial difference. The model with GVCs predicts a
fall in bilateral trade between the UK and the EU that would be more severe with no deal. This
fall would translate into a decrease in total real exports for the EU and the UK of about -2% and
-13% respectively under the FTA scenario, and about -3% and -19% under the MFN scenario.
Welfare losses are contained for the EU, from -0.4% with a deal to -0.6% with no deal, but they
are much bigger for the UK (from -2.1 to -3.1% respectively). To highlight the role of GVCs, we
consider also an alternative version of the model in which we set all sectoral bilateral trade flows
in intermediate products to zero and impute their original amounts to final products. Shutting
down GVCs in this way weakens the impact of Brexit substantially: on average across the EU
the aggregate welfare losses when properly accounting for GVCs are roughly twice as large in
absolute value as those without GVCs. Moreover, input-output linkages between the UK and
the EU would be considerably disrupted.
2
1 Introduction
After decades of significant steps towards trade integration at the international level, global
trade has been expanding at a slower pace since the Great Recession. At the same time, public
opinion and policymakers have started questioning the benefits of free trade. The UK has made
the decision to leave the European Union, the US has experienced a return to protectionism
(Fajgelbaum et al., 2019) while trade barriers have been rising substantially in recent years both
in advanced and developing economies contributing to the weakening of global trade (Evenett,
2019). Rising trade barriers have consequences for prices and economic activity. To the extent
that higher tariff and non-tariff barriers pass through to the prices of intermediate and final
products, higher trade costs can raise consumer prices. This may reduce consumption and
investment, weigh negatively on economic activity and ultimately reduce welfare. In the long
term, allocative inefficiencies due to relative price distortions could further harm welfare through
lower productivity and potential growth.
While the quantification of the impact of trade policy on prices, economic activity and welfare
has always been at the core of trade policy analysis, the complexity of today’s trade relations
raises new unprecedented challenges. In particular, the rise of ’global value chains’ (GVCs),
through which production processes are organized in multiple stages across several countries,
requires the adoption of enhanced analytical frameworks that take the observed international
input-output relations in due account.
The aim of this paper is to propose one such framework and show how it can be operationalized for
quantitative trade policy analysis. In doing so, we first investigate a simple thought experiment
that highlights the importance of allowing for a detailed characterization of GVCs in quantifying
the effects of trade policy shocks. The experiment compares the welfare effects of an uniform
increase in trade costs across the world in two scenarios that differ in terms of the salience of
GVCs. We then apply the proposed framework to the quantitative analysis of the most important
trade policy shock currently affecting the European Union: the impending departure of the UK
(a.k.a. ’Brexit’).
Specifically, we adopt the general equilibrium multi-sector Ricardian trade model of the global
economy with trade in both final and intermediate products designed by Antràs and Chor (2018)
in the wake of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Caliendo
and Parro (2015). By mapping bilateral supply chain linkages and value-added flows, the model
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provides a rich framework that captures countries’ heterogeneity in terms of the composition of
their trade flows as well as in terms of their involvement in GVCs. Antràs and Chor (2018)
use their model to study how trade cost changes affect the correlation between the final-use and
value-added shares in gross output across countries, as production along GVCs becomes more
fragmented across borders. Differently, we use the model to understand how cross-border multi-
stage production affects the transmission of trade policy shocks to national welfare. The model
is rich enough to predict the impact of trade shocks on each sector within each country for both
goods and services. The main caveat is that being based on comparative statics, the model’s
predictions do not include dynamic effects, such as the short-run effects of increased uncertainty
and the transition to a new equilibrium as well as the long-run effects on productivity and growth,
unemployment and migration.
Our analysis relates to several recent studies aimed at quantifying the effects of changes in
trade policies through the implementation of Ricardian models. Among them, Dhingra et al.
(2017) and Felbermayr et al. (2017) analyze the effects of Brexit as we also do. Mayer et al.
(2018) look instead at the "cost of non-Europe", i.e. the cost of un-doing what the process of
European integration has achieved so far by reverting to a shallow regional agreement or to WTO
rules. Just like Eaton and Kortum (2002), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Caliendo
and Parro (2015), the multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium models underlying the
aforementioned papers do include realistic input-output linkages. However, they assume that
industry-level bilateral final and intermediate trade shares are identical, and that the allocation
of imported inputs across sectors is the same as the allocation of domestic inputs. As Johnson
(2017) explains, this amounts to applying two proportionality assumptions, one at the border to
split final goods and inputs, and another behind the border to allocate inputs across industries.
In practice, neither assumption holds in available input-output data sets. Following Antràs and
Chor (2018) allows us to implement a richer input-output structure across countries and sectors
that we can match with the actual one reported in input-output tables. In doing so, we rely on
the value-added decomposition of exports as initially proposed by Koopman et al. (2014) to track
cross-country value-added flows and characterize GVC relations. In this respect, an additional
important contribution of this paper is the construction of a dataset of sectoral ad-valoremWTO-
MFN tariffs for both final and intermediate trade (at the ISIC Rev. 4 classification) that can be
combined with the World Input-Output Database (WIOD).1
1See www.wiod.org for additional details.
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Accordingly, our analysis also relates to an increasing number of papers that combine information
on tariffs with models of trade and value added with the aim of investigating the impacts of
protectionist measures and trade wars. Freund et al. (2018) use a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model to assess the implications of higher bilateral tariffs between China and the US for
developing countries. In Balistreri et al. (2018) a simulated multi-region multi-sector general-
equilibrium model of the global economy is used to evaluate the impacts of tariffs implemented by
the US in 2018 and the subsequent retaliation by trade partners. Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) perform
a similar analysis within the US using a multi-country general equilibrium model. Berthou
et al. (2018) use a 3-region forward-looking DSGE model for the US, the euro area and the
rest of the world to assess the impact on global GDP of a global trade war. Felbermayr and
Steininger (2019) rely on an input-output gravity approach à la Caliendo and Parro (2015) to
assess the consequences of an escalation of bilateral tariffs between the US and China on these
two countries and the EU. Amiti et al. (2019) explore the implications of the radical change in
US trade policy in 2018 on prices and welfare in the US, taking into account the disruption of
global value chains. Finally, Bellora and Fontagné (2019) use a general equilibrium framework
with intermediate and final products to quantify the effects of detailed tariff changes on value
added and welfare. None of these papers, however, zooms in on the actual patterns of GVCs
as we do by building on both Koopman et al. (2014) and Antràs and Chor (2018). The only
relevant exception we are aware of is Baqaee and Farhi (2019), who nonetheless take a different
approach from ours. They quantify gains from trade with non-linear production functions that
feature input complementarities. In this sense, their framework also offers a generalization of the
input-output models emphasized in Caliendo and Parro (2015). Interestingly, compared with
the log-linear production networks common in the literature and in line with our results, Baqaee
and Farhi (2019) find that accounting for nonlinear production networks significantly raises the
gains from trade and the losses from trade protectionism.
Turning to our findings, in the simple thought experiment, we highlight the crucial role of GVCs
in the transmission of trade policy shocks by considering the effects of a uniform 40% increase
in trade barriers in all sectors across all world countries and comparing the model’s predictions
in two scenarios. In the first, we assume the input-output structure observed in 2000. In the
second, we assume instead the input-output structure observed in 2014 when GVCs are much
more salient. This exercise shows that the negative impact of a 40% increase in trade costs on
countries’ welfare (measured as real household income) is on average 36% larger in absolute value
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in 2014 than in 2000, and as much as 219% larger for some countries.
In the Brexit application, we present results for alternative trade policy scenarios ranging from
a EU-UK free trade agreement (FTA) and a reversal to the most favoured nation (MFN) terms
prescribed by the WTO in case of ‘no deal’. We consider also a variation on the MFN scenario
following the schedule of tariffs announced by the UK in March 2019 that involves a drastic and
unilateral reduction by the UK of its MFN import tariffs (New MFN scenario). We conclude that
properly accounting for GVCs makes a substantial difference. The model with GVCs predicts a
fall in bilateral trade between the UK and the EU that would be more severe with no deal. This
fall would translate into a decrease in total real exports for the EU and the UK of about -2% and
-13% respectively under the FTA scenario, and about -3% and -19% under the MFN scenario.
Welfare losses are contained for the EU, from -0.4% with a deal to -0.6% with no deal, but they
are much bigger for the UK (from -2.1 to -3.1% respectively). To highlight the role of GVCs, we
consider also an alternative version of the model in which we set all sectoral bilateral trade flows
in intermediate products to zero and impute their original amounts to final products. Shutting
down GVCs in this way weakens the impact of Brexit substantially: on average across the EU
the aggregate welfare losses when properly accounting for GVCs are roughly twice as large in
absolute value as those without GVCs. Moreover, input-output linkages between the UK and
the EU would be considerably disrupted.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an illustration of the
evolution of GVCs over the years. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 4
discusses its properties with the aid of the simple thought experiment described above. Section
5 illustrates the effects of Brexit on aggregate as well as across sectors and countries. Section 6
concludes.
2 The surge of global value chains
Despite recent setbacks, in the last decades economic integration and trade liberalizations at
the global level together with profound technological transformations have boosted international
trade. Trade openness - defined as the share of trade over GDP - has increased dramatically
until the global financial crisis for both advanced and emerging economies (Figure 1).
A crucial development has been what Baldwin (2016) defines "unbundling", i.e. the international
separation of production stages motivated by cost efficiency considerations and facilitated by
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advancements in information and communication technology (ICT). As a result, the complexity
of production processes has increased, triggering the so-called "global value chain revolution"
whereby the expansion of cross-country production networks has led to a surge in international
trade.
Countries and industries across the globe have become more and more interconnected not only
via trade in final products but also as firms increasingly source their intermediate inputs from
abroad.2 Figure 2 illustrates the complexity of the global input-output network.3 It shows
that from 2000 to 2014 supply chain linkages have become denser, not only within countries
but especially across national borders. It also highlights that over time, sectors have become
increasingly interconnected via GVCs, and that the relevance of large emerging economies such
as China (in light blue) has grown.
Another way to illustrate the development of GVCs in the last decades is to look at widely used
indexes of countries’ participation to GVCs in the wake of Koopman et al. (2014) and Wang
et al. (2013). A country’s GVC participation is computed as the sum of foreign value added
embedded in its exports (‘upstream participation’) and domestic value added embedded in other
countries exports (‘downstream participation’) as share of the country’s total exports. Figure 3
shows that, according to this index, countries’ involvement in cross-border supply chains surged
remarkably across the globe until the Great Recession. Already integrated regions, such as the
European Union, have further expanded their involvement in regional and global supply chains
while relatively less open countries, such as the United States and China, have experienced an
even more pronounced acceleration of their GVC participation.
However, with the trade slowdown that has materialised starting from the Great Recession, the
pace of expansion of GVCs has decreased considerably and GVC participation has receded to
pre-crisis levels.4
One of the main factors determining the stagnation of GVCs is the recent upsurge in protectionist
measures internationally. Counteracting progress in trade liberalisation, discriminatory measures
have been on the rise most notably since 2018, when their increase outpaced liberalising measures
(Figure 4). Escalating trade tensions between two major economies such as the United States
and China are behind this marked rise. Furthermore, prospects of an exit of the UK from the
2See Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) and Di Giovanni et al. (2018) who highlight the crucial role of the
surge in trade in intermediate inputs in synchronising business cycles across countries.
3See also Cerina et al. (2015) for an exploration of the global input-output network from 1995 to 2011 and
Carvalho (2014) for a general discussion on input-output linkages.
4See Timmer et al. (2016) for an account of the global trade slowdown with insights on GVCs developments.
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European Union can be expected to lift trade barriers within the largest integrated trade block
in the world.
3 A general equibrium model of global value chains
In a world of GVCs, quantifying the effects of rising protectionism on countries’ economic activity,
prices and welfare requires the adoption of an enhanced analytical framework that accounts for
the actual international input-output relations and the observed differences in trade barriers
for final and intermediate products. We thus adopt the model developed by Antràs and Chor
(2018), as an extension of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and
Caliendo and Parro (2015), in order to consider the full pattern of intermediate input purchases
and final-use expenditures as measured in available World Input-Output Tables (WIOT) as well
as the corresponding tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers (NTB). This framework will allow us to
explore the impacts of trade cost changes on the fortunes of nations through the reorganization
of the GVCs they are involved in. Sectoral heterogeneity will be an important dimension in this
analysis as impacts of trade cost changes may differ across countries depending on the sectoral
composition of their economies and the relative importance of different foreign markets.
Chart 1: Small World Economy with Input-Output structure
Notes: Entries in the table represent exports from sectors/countries in the rows to sectors/countries in the
column.
As example of the level of detail needed, Chart 1 shows the input-output table of a simplified
world economy. Countries are aggregated in three groups: the UK, the EU (without the UK) and
the Rest of the World (RoW). Industries are aggregated in three macro-sectors: manufacturing,
services and the rest (which we call ‘non-manufacturing’). The table consists of two blocks for
intermediate inputs and final goods. This distinction is crucial for both (i) computing the actual
tariff costs and (ii) mapping the observed input-output linkages into the model.
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Chart 2 depicts the case of a model in which intermediates are not traded internationally. Such
model would not allow one to consider the effect of changes in the trade costs of intermediate
products, as illustrated also in Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014).
Chart 2: Input-Output table with no trade in intermediates
Notes: Entries in the table represent exports from sectors/countries in the rows to sectors/countries in the column.
Shaded areas indicate non-zero entries.
Differently, Chart 3 illustrates the input-output matrix of the model by Eaton and Kortum (2002)
as well as its extension by Caliendo and Parro (2015). These models feature cross-country trade
in intermediates. However, they do not allow one to precisely map the input-output structure,
as they assume that trade shares and the trade costs for intermediate and final products are
identical.
Chart 3: Caliendo and Parro (2015) input-output table
Notes: Entries in the table represent exports from sectors/countries in the rows to sectors/countries in the column.
Shaded areas indicate non-zero entries. The row sum of the entries in the intermediate block highlighted in red
is equal to the value of the corresponding row entry in the final block. In other words, intermediate exports from
a sector-country to another country are equal to final exports to that country.
To be able to work with an input-output matrix like Chart 1, which does not impose unrealistic
constraints on the trade shares and costs of intermediate and final products, we thus build on the
model by Antràs and Chor (2018).5 This model considers a perfectly competitive world economy
consisting of J countries, indexed j = 1, ..., J , and S sectors, indexed s = 1, ..., S. Country j’s
5Here we offer a streamlined presentation of the model. See Antràs and Chor (2018) for further details.
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consumers and firms source sector s’s final and intermediate goods from the lowest price supplier







where Csj is the consumption of good j supplied by sector s and α
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). In this distribution T sj governs the state of
technology of country j in sector s, while θs > 1 governs (inversely) the dispersion of productivity
in sector s across producers, thereby shaping comparative advantage. This randomness makes
consumers’ and firms’ optimal sourcing decisions the solutions to the discrete choice problem
with random parameters of choosing the lowest price source country.
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where Υ is a constant that depends only on γrsj for r = 1, ...,M , wj is the price of labour, and
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P rsj is the price index of intermediate inputs:




























These price indexes depend on technologies (T sj ), unit costs (c
s
j) and trade costs (τ
rs
ij ). Trade
costs are of the iceberg type with τ rsij ≥ 1 measuring the number of units of a good produced by
sector r for use in sector s that have to be shipped from country i to country j for one unit to
reach destination. The fraction τ rsij − 1 melts away in transit. The price indexes also depend on
sector-specific productivity dispersion (θr).
In equilibrium, the shares of final and intermediate products sector s in country j buys from


































which themselves depend on technologies (T sj ), unit costs (c
s
j) and trade costs (τ
rs
ij ). They also
depend on the productivity dispersion parameters (θr). These can now be interpreted as sector-
specific trade elasticities as they measure (in absolute value) the percentage fall in a sector’s
bilateral trade due to a 1% increase in the bilateral iceberg trade cost. This will allow us to
use the trade elasticities that Felbermayr et al. (2017) estimate by Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) structural gravity regressions based on (5) and (6). In particular, they
estimate θr as the elasticity of trade flows to tariffs controlling for non-tariff barriers through
sectoral bilateral EU and other FTA dummies in a model-consistent way. The trade elasticities
and NTBs we use are reported in Table B1 in Appendix B.
The solution of the model is closed by two sets of market clearing conditions and a trade balance
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where Dj denotes the trade deficit so that the two terms on the right hand side correspond to
total expenditures on the country’s intermediate and final products respectively. The second
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where the two terms on the right hand side correspond to the country’s total output levels of
intermediate and final products respectively.
The trade balance condition requires that country j’s aggregate imports equal the aggregate
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Finally, the equilibrium is defined by the following system of equations: J × S equations in (2),
J × (J − 1) × S equations in (3), J × S equations in (4), J × (J − 1) × S × S equations in (5),
J × (J − 1) × S equations in (6), J × S − 1 equations in (8), and J equations in (9). In this
system of equations one seeks to solve for the following unknown variables: J × (J − 1) × S × S
independent intermediate trade shares πrsij , J × (J − 1) × S independent final trade shares πrFij ,
J × S unit production costs csj , J × S × S intermediate goods price indices P rsj , J × S final
goods price indices P rFj , J −1 wage levels wj (one is a numeraire), and J ×S gross output levels
Y sj . This is computationally demanding. However, in order to obtain the effects of a change in
trade costs on wages, output and prices, the system of equilibrium equations can be solved in
differences using the so-called "hat algebra" approach of Dekle et al. (2008) and Caliendo and
Parro (2015). By applying goods market-clearing and trade balance conditions, the "hat algebra"
allows deriving results for changes in the variables of interest, without knowing the initial levels
of the target variables. In particular, in addition to the changes in trade costs, the only pieces
of information actually needed are the trade shares (πrsij and π
rF
ij ), the trade elasticities (θ
r) and




4 Tariff hikes and global value chains
Do GVCs matter in determining the effects of protectionist trade shocks on national economies?
To answer this question we use the model detailed in the previous section to compare the effects
of a 40% increase in bilateral trade costs between all sector-country pairs in two scenarios:
‘sparse’ GVCs corresponding to the world input-output structure in 2000 and ‘dense’ GVCs
corresponding to the world input-output structure in 2014. These structures are based on the
World Input-Output Database (www.wiod.org), which considers 56 sectors and covers all EU
countries as well as other 14 countries individually plus all remaining countries together as ‘Rest
of the World’. For ease of comparison, in both scenarios we assume the same trade elasticities
(equal to 5 for all sectors and countries) so that differences between the effects of the trade shock
in the two years will depend solely on changes in the world input-output structure.
To illustrate these changes, Figure 5 contrasts various trade indicators calculated using world
input-output tables for 2000 and 2014. Two pieces of evidence are worth noticing. First, with
few exceptions, from 2000 to 2014 trade openness - defined as the sum of imports and exports
over total production - increases for all countries in the sample. Second, in line with Section 2,
during the same period the observed increase in trade openness is mainly driven by GVC-related
trade (bottom left panel), which expands by 59% on average across countries, compared with
an average 20% increase of value added in final exports (top right panel). Another measure of
involvement in GVCs, i.e. foreign value added in exports (bottom right panel), delivers similar
conclusions with values that are on average 63% higher in 2014.
Against this backdrop, we look at two outcome variables: welfare, as measured by real household
income6, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Figure 6 shows that all countries lose welfare
from the 40% increase in trade costs and that the welfare losses are on average 36% larger in
absolute value with dense GVCs than with sparse ones. For some countries (Bulgaria, Japan,
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic) the impact of a 40% increment in trade costs is more than
twice larger in 2014 than in 2000. These are indeed the countries experiencing the largest increase
in (GVC-driven) trade openness as shown in Figure 5.
In order to investigate the fundamental mechanisms underpinning these results, Table 1
illustrates the relation between the welfare effects of the trade cost shock and the measures
of trade openness and GVC participation illustrated in Figure 5 by comparing the absolute
6In an economy modelled as in Section 3, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) boils down to real household
income, i.e. real wages.
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correlations computed with sparse and dense GVCs. These correlations are quite high in both
2000 and 2014, which is explained by the fact that the larger exports are, the higher are the
losses from a surge in trade barriers given that domestic production is more reliant on foreign
demand. While this holds in both years, it is interesting to look at how each component of gross
exports is related to the magnitude of the trade cost shock. In this respect, Table 1 shows that
in both years the welfare effects of the trade cost shock are much more correlated with GVC
exports (shipments that cross the borders many times) than with final exports (shipments that
cross the border only once). The reason is that the more a country is involved in GVCs, the
larger in absolute value is the loss from the protectionist cost shock, as the increase in trade costs
cumulates when intermediates repeatedly cross borders. Indeed, the higher is a country’s value-
added content in its exports that gets re-exported (IV ) and the higher is the foreign value added
in its exports (FV ), the larger in absolute value are its welfare losses. However, the correlation
of welfare changes is much larger with IV than with FV.
Zooming in on price effects, Figure 7 compares the impacts of a 10% and a 40% increases in trade
costs applied to a global economy characterised by the input-output structure existing in 2014.7
The figure shows that, for most of the countries, the smaller increase in trade costs is inflationary
while the larger one is deflationary as it would depress prices in half of the countries in the sample.
With a 10% rise in trade costs, on average prices grow by 0.8% whereas a 40% increase leads
to an average drop in prices of -0.3%. Intuitively, this asymmetry arises from the interplay of
two opposite forces. On the one hand, higher trade costs make imported intermediate inputs
more expensive and this tends to increase prices. On the other hand, more expensive imported
inputs depress economic activity and this tends to decrease prices. The former force dominates
for a small rise in trade costs, whereas the latter force dominates for a large rise in trade costs.
Clearly, the relative strength of the two opposite forces on prices is specific to the composition of
trade flows. The larger the amount of imports relative to exports, the stronger the inflationary
force; conversely, the larger the weight of exports in a country’s production, the stronger the
depressing impact of higher trade costs on economic activity. Price effects turn out to be indeed
negatively correlated with countries’ trade balances with correlation coefficients equal to -0.6 and
-0.86 in 2000 and 2014 respectively.
7Results obtained by using the 2000 input-output structure are qualitatively similar.
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5 The impact of Brexit when global value chains matter
The simple thought experiment discussed in the previous section has clearly shown that properly
accounting for GVCs can make a sizable difference for the quantification of the impacts of trade
policies on economic activity, prices and welfare. It has also suggested that the impacts can vary
substantially both across sectors due to their specific input-output linkages and across countries
due their different degree of participation to global production networks. We will now study how
these two dimensions of heterogeneity become crucial when one wants to quantify the impacts
of more realistic trade policy shocks that are not uniform across tariff lines as was instead the
case with the foregoing thought experiment.
The trade policy shock we consider is the one related to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU,
commonly known as ‘Brexit’. We consider three alternative scenarios for the post-Brexit trade
regime between the UK and the other EU countries. In our first scenario, we assume that the two
parties sign a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) leading to no variation in tariffs on trade
in goods. However, administrative, technical and regulatory barriers for trade in both goods and
services (non-tariff barriers - NTBs) are assumed to increase. Moreover, we assume that the UK
is able to maintain its current trade agreements with the rest of the world.
In the second scenario, no trade agreement (‘no deal’) is signed between the UK and the other
EU countries. As a result, UK trade in goods with the EU is subject to higher import duties
levied on most favoured nation (MFN) terms as prescribed by the WTO rules. Moreover, NTBs
on the exchange of goods and services also rise substantially8.
In the third and last scenario, we consider a variation on the MFN scenario that follows the
temporary schedule of duties announced by the UK government in March 2019 for imports
from the EU and elsewhere in case of no deal. The announced schedule entails the removal
of UK import tariffs on a majority of products, but also the introduction of duties on specific
manufacturing goods (such as cars) and on some agricultural products. This scenario, which we
call ‘New MFN’, involves a drastic and unilateral reduction by the UK of its MFN import tariffs,
thus increasing the international openness of its economy. It allows us to evaluate the potential
ability of the UK to substitute non-EU markets for the European single market.
In the MFN and New MFN scenarios NTBs are higher than the FTA scenario, as the latter is
8The ad-valorem equivalent NTBs under the FTA and the MFN scenario are obtained from the coefficients of
a bilateral FTA and a EU dummy estimates in the PPML structural equations in Felbermayr et al. (2017), see
Table B1 in Appendix B.
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assumed to include provisions aimed at removing non-tariff impediments to trade.
5.1 Data and descriptive statistics
While still based on the WIOD, the analysis of the effects of Brexit relies on a richer quantitative
implementation of the theoretical model, in which sectors are allowed to feature different trade
elasticities as empirically observed (see Imbs and Méjean 2017). We take the values of these
elasticities from Felbermayr et al. (2017), who, as already mentioned, estimate them by PPML
in structural gravity regressions consistent with our theoretical framework. On the other hand,
as there are no off-the-shelf measures of the sectoral trade barriers we need to simulate the MFN
and New MFN scenarios, we have devised a detailed crosswalk from WTO product-level tariff
lines to WIOD sectors, distinguishing between intermediate and final uses. See Appendix A for
details.
5.1.1 Trade interdependence
The UK and other EU countries are extensively involved in bilateral trade, half of which is due
to their integration in common supply chains. While for the UK the rest of the EU (‘EU27’)
represents the biggest trading partner, with more than 45% of UK trade flows involving EU27
countries, the share of EU27 trade with the UK amounts only to about 6% (Figure 8). Moreover,
about half of the total UK-EU27 trade flows are related to supply chains, which cross countries’
borders several times and involve also value added produced in or directed to third countries.
Among EU27 countries, trade exposure to the UK is quite heterogeneous, ranging from 22% for
Malta to 2% for Slovenia (Figure 9).9
The reciprocal trade exposure of the most exposed sectors in the UK and the EU is substantial.
As in the case of aggregate trade, the share of UK sectors’ trade with the rest of the EU is much
larger than that of EU27 sectors with the UK. In particular, Figures 10 and 11 show that the
trade shares of the 20 most exposed UK sectors exceed 50%, with telecommunication and car-
related sectors at around 80% and 60%. With the exception of pharmaceutical, non-car vehicles
and food, the most exposed sectors in the EU are, instead, service sectors. Although some
professional and finance auxiliary services are quite involved in trade with the UK (with a share
higher than 30%), those trade flows are mostly GVC-related. This is not the case with bilateral
9Balance of payment data for the year 2017 might differ from the WIOD data used in the figures. Most notably,
Malta’s share is overstated in the WIOD data, while Greece’s share is understated.
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trade flows of real estate services, which mostly consist of intermediate and final products either
directly supplied by the UK for final use in the EU or vice versa.
5.1.2 MFN tariffs
In our analysis, the FTA, the MFN and the New MFN scenarios are compared with the status
quo. Whereas NTBs will be higher than they currently are in all scenarios, the MFN and New
MFN scenarios also imply a generalized increase in tariffs as we assume that, with no deal, the
EU and the UK apply to each other’s imports the same tariff schedule they currently apply
to countries with which they have no FTA in place. There is, however, substantial variation
across sectors and countries. The EU’s MFN tariff schedule varies across product categories,
with agriculture, textile and transport products facing higher tariffs. Hence, heterogeneity in
the product composition of countries’ and sectors’ trade flows gives rise to considerable variation
in their aggregate tariffs. Moreover, within the same broad sector, tariffs on final (e.g. motor
vehicles) and intermediate products (e.g. motor vehicles components) can be very different, with
the former being generally higher than the latter.10 Substantial variation characterizes also the
estimated ad-valorem equivalents of NTBs (see Table B1 in Appendix B).
Figure 12 (Figure 13) shows the average bilateral tariffs that, according to our calculations, the
UK (the EU) would apply to imports from the EU (the UK) at the sector level, distinguishing
between intermediate and final uses. Given the product composition of bilateral trade flows, the
average duty imposed by the UK on goods imported from the EU would be 5.3 per cent whereas
the duty imposed by the EU on British goods would be 3.9 per cent.11
The UK imports a relatively high share of final goods from the EU: half of the value of UK im-
ports from the EU is constituted by products for final consumption, mainly motor vehicles and
food products. On the contrary, the EU imports a relatively high share of intermediate inputs
from the UK: about 62% of imports from the UK are given by goods subsequently processed
in the EU economies especially chemical, mining and metal products. Considering a sectoral
disaggregation at the ISIC Rev. 4, in a MFN scenario about 40% of the EU goods delivered
to the UK market would face tariffs exceeding 5%. Almost half of these high tariff goods are
‘motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers’, which would incur a tariff of 8.5% on average. Even
10This is consistent with ’tariff escalation’ practices, which consist in increasing trade barriers along subsequent
stages of a processing chain.
11Average tariffs differ slightly from those in Cappariello et al. (2018) whose calculation is based on the sector
shares of the WIOD data.
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‘food products, beverages, and tobacco’, which represent a significant share of total UK imports
from the EU27 (about 11%), would potentially face an extremely high tariff rate. Turning to EU
imports from the UK, the share of products potentially affected by duties exceeding 5% (such as
automotive and food) is much lower (24%).
Figure 12 presents also the average duty in sectors (such as motor vehicles, crop and animal
production, textile) that would face UK import tariffs in the New MFN scenario. In this case,
the average duty imposed by the UK on imports from the EU would be equal to about 1%, much
lower than in the MFN scenario.
in Appendix C Figure C1 presents the MFN average tariffs that would be imposed on inter-
mediate, final and total goods imports by the UK from each EU Member States when sectoral
tariffs are aggregated at the country level weighted by sectoral import shares. The figure reveals
considerable cross-country variation driven by different sectoral specialisation, with 14 countries
facing average MFN tariffs higher than 5%. Tariffs potentially applied by the EU to products
imported from the UK would be generally lower (Figure C2, Appendix C).
5.2 Results and robustness checks
In this section we present the effects of Brexit under our three scenarios on trade flows and
three outcome variables nominal GDP, welfare and the CPI. We start with an aggregate view
distinguishing between the UK and the other EU countries (EU27). We then unpack the EU27
to discuss cross-country and cross-sector heterogeneity. Next, we report the effects of Brexit on
countries’ GVC linkages. Finally, we conclude with a sensitivity analysis of our results.
5.2.1 Aggregate effects
Under the FTA, the MFN and the New MFN scenarios, bilateral trade between the UK and the
EU27 decreases substantially in nominal terms (Table 2). In the FTA scenario, exports from
the UK to the EU27 fall by -31.4% and -38.3% for intermediates and final goods respectively.
Those from the EU27 to the UK fall by -27.3% and -28.2% respectively. While exports from the
Rest of the World increase only towards the UK (by 6.9%) for final goods, they increase towards
both the EU and the UK (by 2.1% and 7.4% respectively) for intermediates. The trade effects
of Brexit are more pronounced in the MFN scenario. Exports from the UK to the EU27 fall by
-45.5% and -53.7% for intermediates and final goods respectively. Those from the EU27 to the
18
UK fall by -40.6% and -43.9% respectively. Again, exports from the Rest of the World increase
only towards the UK (by 13.9%) for final goods, but towards both the EU27 and the UK (by
1.7% and 10.7% respectively) for intermediates.
The effects of Brexit on trade flows are not much different in the New MFN scenario, which
highlights the difficulty faced by the UK and the EU27 in replacing their single market.
These nominal changes translate into lower real exports for the EU27 and the UK of about -2%
and -13% respectively in the FTA scenario, and as much as 3% and 19% respectively in the MFN
scenario (Table 3). They are slightly less marked in the New MFN scenario.
For imports the fall in real flows is more pronounced than for exports in all scenarios, especially
for the UK whose imports decrease by more than 15% in the FTA scenario and by more than
20% in the MFN one.12
Less trade is associated with lower welfare, with losses that are larger for the UK than the EU27
although with substantial heterogeneity across member countries. UK and EU27 real household
income levels decrease respectively by -2.1% and -0.4% in the FTA scenario, and by -3.1% and
-0.6% in the MFN scenario. For the UK the fall in nominal GDP is slightly less pronounced
than in welfare in both the FTA and the MFN scenarios. In the New MFN scenario UK nominal
GDP would fall in a similar way than welfare because imports from the rest of world substitute
the production of domestic suppliers.
In addition, in the New MFN scenario the increase in UK import prices is less marked than
in the MFN scenario so that consumer prices increase by less and this curtails the negative
impact of Brexit on welfare. Indeed, UK prices (as measured by the CPI) rise less in the New
MFN scenario not only than in the MFN scenario but also than the FTA one thanks to cheaper
imports from the rest of the world. Differently, EU prices levels are essentially unaffected by
Brexit in all scenario, with the largest but still neglibile decrease happening in the MFN scenario
(-0.06%). As discussed for the simple thought experiment in Section 4, such asymmetry arises
from the interplay of two opposite forces. Higher trade costs make imported intermediate inputs
more expensive and this tends to increase prices. However, more expensive imported inputs also
depress economic activity and this tends to decrease prices. The former force dominates the
latter in the UK, whereas the two forces tend to offset each other in the EU27.
The relative magnitudes of our trade and welfare effects summarized in table 3 are broadly in
line with those of previous studies based on the same class of models such as Dhingra et al., 2017
12Individual country results are reported in Appendix C, Figures C3.
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and Felbermayr et al., 2017. They are, however, bigger in absolute terms.
There are several reasons for this. First, differently from those studies, our framework fully
captures the actual GVC linkages and this leads to stronger reactions to trade cost increases as
shown in Section 4. Second, both Dhingra et al. (2017) and Felbermayr et al. (2017) rely on
an older version of the WIOD input-output tables (2011 vs. 2014), which matters given that,
especially in the case of the EU, there has been a remarkable increase in GVC integration in the
intervening years (see Figure 3). Third, as the sectoral breakdown of the WIOD input-output
tables is less detailed for 2011 than for 2014, previous studies fail to capture the extent of sectoral
heterogeneity we exploit. Fourth, the design of the scenarios is different. We assume that the
UK will maintain the preferential trade agreements with non-EU trading partners that were
signed while in the EU. The other papers assume instead that the UK will be forced to adopt
MFN tariffs with all non-EU partners.13 Finally, also due to different sectoral breakdown, we
use different trade elasticities. The sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2.4 shows results with the
alternative trade elasticities used in the previous studies that tend to deliver smaller effects.
5.2.2 Country and sector effects
Country-level results show very heterogeneous welfare losses, with Malta, Luxembourg, and
Ireland hit the most by Brexit (Figure 14). 14 For these small EU27 countries welfare losses are
bigger than for the UK. This is due to their high trade exposure to UK sectors with large trade
elasticities, most prominently services.15 It is also explained by the limited diversification of their
trade linkages. Welfare losses for large EU27 countries are much less pronounced and below -0.3%
even in the MFN scenario. Welfare effects compound a generalized fall in nominal GDP (Figure
15) with the CPI rising in some countries and falling in others (Figure 16). This depends again
on whether or not the inflationary impact of more expensive imported intermediates dominates
their depressing impact on economic activity. The largest price increases are observed for Ireland
and Cyprus, due to their heavy reliance on UK final products and intermediate inputs.
As for sectoral patterns, in the MFN and the new MFN scenarios the most affected sectors in the
13The UK government has been working on new preferential trade agreements in case of a no-deal Brexit.
Some new agreements have already been signed, while others are still under discussion. See https://www.gov.
uk/guidance/uk-trade-agreements-with-non-eu-countries-in-a-no-deal-brexit for updated lists.
14Further details on the quantitative results underlying Figures 14, 15 and 16 can be found in Table C1 in
Appendix C.
15The difference with respect to the UK is attenuated when we use other sets of trade elasticities (Figure 18 in
Section 5.2.4). Moreover, the welfare losses we compute for Malta, Luxembourg and Ireland could be overstated
if services firms currently in the UK relocated to other EU countries.
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EU27 are finance-related sectors, manufacturing of other transport equipment, other professional
activities and textiles, with losses in nominal value added ranging from -2% to -3% (Table 4).16
Differently, in case of no-deal in the UK the most affected sectors tend to belong to manufacturing
(Table 5). Notable exceptions are food and car sectors, which see their value added rise. Yet,
as we have seen in the previous subsection, the aggregate effects of Brexit are nevertheless
significantly negative.
Turning to trade flows, it is interesting to zoom in on the financial sector. In the MFN sce-
nario, the -53% decline of UK finance-related exports to the EU27 is roughly in line with the
aggregate patterns in Table 2. However, for the EU27 the decrease in exports to the UK in the
financial sector is much more pronounced than on aggregate (-55% vs around -40%). All non-EU
countries also experience reductions in their finance-related exports to the UK. This highlights
the disruptive effects of Brexit on finance in the absence of substitution between EU and non-
EU countries, which makes UK finance-related imports fall by -29%. As a consequence of the
decline in both sectoral and aggregate activity, UK exporters in the financial sector gain some
competitiveness as wages are depressed. Accordingly, the fall in UK exports is less pronounced
than in UK imports and amounts to -9.2% (with a severe decline in exports to the EU27 and a
mild increase in exports to the rest of the world). Within the EU27 there is an overall decline
in finance-related exports by -4.7%. However, there is also striking cross-country heterogeneity.
Indeed, the average effect is slightly positive and the overall effect is entirely driven by Malta
and, most of all, Luxembourg. For other countries, intra-EU exports actually increase, pointing
to some substitution within the EU27.
In general, it is clear that sectoral and country results partly depend on exposure to EU-UK
trade. Different sector-specific trade elasticities and trade barriers also play a substantial role in
determining countries’ outcomes. Specifically, countries more exposed to EU-UK trade in more
elastic sectors (such as services sectors) suffer the largest welfare losses.
5.2.3 Supply chains effects
In Section 5.1 we have shown that the UK and the rest of the EU are deeply integrated through
GVCs. We have also observed that a sizable part of EU trade consists of GVC-related flows.
Against this backdrop, we now deepen our investigation of the effects of Brexit in two ways.
First, we quantify the extent to which the sheer existence of GVC linkages between the UK and
16Country-specific results are available upon request.
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the EU27 affects the transmission of the Brexit trade shock to national welfare. Second, we look
at how those GVCs linkages are themselves affected by the Brexit trade shock. In doing so, we
leverage the ability of the model to map all the entries of the world input-output tables.
The role of trade in intermediates How does the existence of GVC linkages affect the wel-
fare effects of Brexit? To answer this question, we compare some key results reported in Section
5.2 with parallel ones obtained in a simplified counterfactual economy in which all bilateral trade
flows in intermediate products are set to zero and the corresponding actual amounts are allocated
to final products in the same sector. By focusing on the MFN scenario, Figure 17 highlights how
GVC linkages greatly magnify the effects of the Brexit trade cost shock on national welfare:
by 105% on average within a range from 25% to 176%. Hence, disregarding GVCs would lead
to a substantial underestimation of the welfare effects of Brexit in all countries. The reason is
that, as captured by the model’s equations (2) and (3), when GVCs are properly accounted for,
higher trade costs for the intermediate inputs supplied by any given sector translate into higher
production costs in all sectors using those inputs, leading to an escalation of production costs as
intermediates are shipped back and forth across borders along the value chain.
Figure 17 shows the results also for a simplified one-sector model akin to some of the most
frequently used macroeconomic models. The consequences of such simplification are ambiguous
with welfare losses that are more pronounced than in the multi-sector case for some countries
and less pronounced for others.
These findings on the comparisons of results with or without GVCs and with one or many sectors
are consistent with Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014), who conduct a comparative analysis
of general equilibrium models under several alternative modeling assumptions.
The effects of Brexit on UK-EU27 GVCs How will European GVCs reorganize after
Brexit? To answer this question, we first take the most recent international input-output table
(those for 2014 in the WIOD) and decompose UK and EU27 bilateral exports into direct flows
between country pairs and indirect flows through third countries (GVC-related trade). We then
simulate the changes in trade costs (tariff and non-tariff barriers) implied by Brexit under the
FTA and MFN scenarios to obtain the counterfactual post-Brexit international input-output
tables. Finally, we use these tables to decompose the simulated post-Brexit exports into direct
and indirect flows.
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The results of this exercise are depicted in Tables 6 and 7 for direct and indirect exports respec-
tively. Table 6 shows that after Brexit direct bilateral exports between the UK and the EU27
shrink in both scenarios. In the FTA scenario, direct exports decrease by -24% from the EU27 to
the UK and -16% from the UK to the EU27. In the MFN scenario, the decline of direct exports
is -40% from the EU27 to the UK and -33% from the UK to the EU27.
Turning to GVC-related trade, two things are worth noticing in Table 7. First, the UK is
significantly reliant on supply chains with the other EU countries. A considerable share of UK’s
exports is used as input in the EU27 for the production of products destined for other countries
in the EU (7.4% of total exports) or in the rest of the world (7.8% of total exports), in other
words the UK substantially utilises EU27 countries’ as ’export platform’. This is not the case
for the EU27, for which just 1% of its total exports are channeled through the UK. Second,
especially for the EU27, the decline in GVC-related trade is quite substantial, especially in trade
flows redirected by the UK to other EU countries: -46% in the FTA scenario and -66% in the
MFN one.17 Conversely, for the UK, the decline of indirect trade via the rest of the EU to other
EU countries is much lower: -8% in the FTA scenario and -23% in the MFN one.18 This suggests
that other EU countries can more easily substitute the UK with other trading partners, most
likely within the EU.
5.2.4 Sensitity analysis
Our results on the effects of tariff hikes and Brexit are obtained by feeding the computations
derived from the theoretical model with observable parameter values calculated from the input-
output tables as well as consistently estimated trade elasticities and NTBs (obtained from the
observed effects of trade agreements). In particular, the estimates of elasticities and NTBs are
obtained from structural gravity regressions that are fully consistent with a wide range of trade
models, including the model by Antràs and Chor (2018) on which we build.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to assess the sensitivity of our results to the alternative choices of
elasticities and NTBs. As a first alternative, we set the trade elasticity to 5 for all sectors in all
countries. This choice is consistent with the average elasticities estimated for advanced economies
by Imbs and Méjean (2017), although it is somewhat higher than the average sector elasticities
17The decline of EU27’s exports through the UK towards the non-EU countries is -21% and -35% in the FTA
and MFN scenarios respectively.
18The decline of the UK’s exports through the EU27 towards the rest of the world (non-EU countries) is -10%
and -24% in the FTA and MFN scenario, respectively.
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estimated by Felbermayr et al. (2017) that we use (see Table B1). As a second alternative,
we adopt the same elasticities and NTBs as Dhingra et al. (2017). For manufacturing sectors,
these authors use the sectoral elasticities estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2015). These range
from 0.4 to 51.1. For services, however, they also impose the same elasticity equal to 5 in all
sectors. As for NTBs, Dhingra et al. (2017) adopt estimates from Berden et al. (2013) based on
econometric and survey-based calculations.
Compared with our baseline results, in the MFN scenario aggregate welfare losses from Brexit
are smaller with both sets of alternative parameter values. This holds for both the EU27 and
the UK. When the trade elasticity is set to 5 in all sectors, welfare falls by -0.28% for the EU27
and -1.66% for the UK. For the parameter values used by Dhingra et al. (2017), the welfare loss
is -0.24% for the EU27 and -1.4% for the UK. Figure 18 shows that the most notable deviations
from our previous results concern small countries, in particular Malta, Luxembourg and Ireland.
Among the largest countries, deviations are larger for France and Spain, for which the impact
of Brexit is weaker with a uniform elasticity equal to 5. Deviations are smaller for Germany,
but in this case a uniform elasticity equal to 5 generates a stronger impact. These patterns are
explained by the fact that countries differ in terms of the sectoral composition of their trade
flows and sectors differ in terms of the trade elasticities we use.
6 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the long-term effects of trade cost shocks in a world in which GVCs
play a crucial role. After reporting a set of stylized facts on the emergence and the development of
cross-country production networks, we have introduced a multi-country multi-sector quantitative
general equilibrium model. By mapping bilateral supply chain linkages and value-added flows,
the model has allowed us to capture the magnifying effect of multi-stage production on the
transmission of international trade policy shocks to national welfare.
To highlight the quantitatively relevant role GVCs play in the transmission of trade shocks, we
have first analyzed a simple thought experiment in which bilateral trade costs rise uniformly
by 40% between all country pairs in the world. We have shown that, for almost all countries,
the welfare effects are considerably larger in a world characterized by the more developed GVCs
existing in 2014 than by the less developed GVCs existing in 2000. On average, welfare effects
in 2014 are 36% larger (and as much as 219% larger for some countries) than in 2000.
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We have then applied our model to the quantification of the effects of Brexit under alternative
trade policy scenarios. The model predicts a fall in bilateral trade between the UK and the
EU that would be more severe in the case in which trade between the two parties fell back to
MFN terms (’no deal’). To reveal the importance of GVCs for these results, we have considered
also an alternative version of the model in which we have set all sectoral bilateral trade flows of
intermediate products to zero and imputed their original amounts to final products. On average,
the aggregate welfare losses with GVCs are roughly twice as large as those without GVCs.
Being based on comparative statics, our model’s predictions do not include dynamic effects,
such as the short-run effects of increased uncertainty and the transition to a new equilibrium as
well as the long-run welfare effects through productivity growth, unemployment and migration.
They show, however, that properly accounting for observed GVC linkages makes a substantial
difference for the quantification of the general equilibrium effects of protectionist trade policies.
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A Methodology to estimate tariffs by sector and end-use
This appendix describes the data sources and the procedures that have been used to construct a
framework of ad-valorem WTO-MFN tariffs for both final and intermediate trade at the ISIC Rev.
4 classification, a framework suitable to be combined with the WIOD Input-Output database.
A.1 Tariff and trade data
We obtain the average tariffs that would be imposed on goods imported by each Member State
from the UK (and vice versa) by using information from the WTO-IDB database on the EU
MFN tariffs. Data have been retrieved through the WITS, a platform developed by the World
Bank that gives access to information on trade and tariffs compiled by various international
organizations (https://wits.worldbank.org/). The WTO-IDB database provides ad-valorem
tariffs (i.e. charged as a percentage of the value of the good imported) for about 5,000 product
lines defined according to a 6-digits HS Combined classification. However, since almost 200
products, mostly in "food and live animals" industry, are charged by quantity or by weight
allowing a minimum and maximum ranges of tariffs, their ad-valorem MFN tariffs are missing in
the WTO-IDB database. For these products we use the estimated ad-valorem equivalent tariffs
drawn from the International Trade Centre Market Access Map (ITC MAP) based on the weight-
based tariffs taken at the minimum rate. Finally, for products for which the WTO arrangements
envisage tariff rate quotas - a combination of an import tariff and an import quota by which
imports below a specified quantity is charged at a lower tariff (Inside Quota Tariff Rate, IQRT)
and imports above that quantity at a higher one (Outside Quota Tariff Rate, OQRT) - we adopt
the IQRTs from the same data source. Given this approach, our estimates of tariffs, especially
for an industry like "food and live animals", may be considered as a lower bound of the tariffs
that could be potentially applied. These ad-valorem tariff data are matched with trade statistics
for year 2014 from the UN ComTrade database, which contains annual bilateral trade flows at
the HS 2012-6 digits classification.
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A.2 From the HS 2012 to the ISIC Rev.4 classification
We construct our dataset of MFN tariffs and bilateral good flows, classified according to both
their end-use category and ISIC Rev. 4 industry classification, through a process that requires
many steps. First of all, we assign to each product-level tariff and its corresponding bilateral
flow a classification according to their final and intermediate use. To this aim, we use the
correspondence table between HS (2012 Revision) 6-digit commodities and the BEC classifica-
tions drawn from WIITS. In general, these correspondences provide a clean mapping to classify
trade according the end-use category. Next steps present some complications. We transpose
our data from the Harmonized System 2012 (HS 2012) to the Central Product Classification,
Version 2.1 (CPC Ver. 2.1) by using a correspondence table from Ramon (http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_REL). The reason for this step is
that a direct correspondence table from the HS 2012 classification to the ISIC Rev. 4 is not
available. That said, the correspondence among the HS 2012 and the CPC 2.1 sectors is not
univocal. In the simple case when to one HS 2012 sector correspond many CPC 2.1 sectors, we
split in equal shares the import values to the different CPC 2.1 sectors attributing them the same
ad-valorem MFN tariff and the same end-use category. In the opposite case when to different
HS 2012 sectors corresponds only a CPC 2.1 sector (this is the case for about 500 observations),
we sum the HS 2012 tariff and import values that correspond to the same CPC 2.1 sector and
attribute to it the prevailing (in terms of number of HS 2012 sectors) end-use category. Finally,
we convert data from the CPC 2.1 to the ISIC Rev. 4 classification. Even in this case when to
one CPC 2.1 sector correspond many different ISIC groups, we split in equal shares the import
values to the different ISIC Rev. 4 groups attributing them the same ad-valorem MFN tariff and
the same end-use category. In the case when many CPC 2.1 sectors correspond to just a single
ISIC 4 sector, we calculate the value of tariff and imports of that sector as the sum of tariffs and
imports of the corresponding CPC 2.1 sectors by end-use category. Finally, tariff and import
values are aggregated from the ISIC classification at 4 digits (238 sectors) to the 3 digits one (32
sectors) and the average tariff are calculated.
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B Other Data and Results
Table B1: Estimated trade elasticities and non-tariff barriers under FTA and MFN scenarios
Sources: WIOD and Felbermayr et al. (2017).
Notes: Trade elasticities are obtained by Felbermayr et al. (2017) by estimating the coefficient of a bilateral
(sector-to-country), time-variant tariff variable in a sector-level gravity model with Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML). As service products are not subject to tariffs, an average trade elasticity is imposed and
calculated from estimated average elasticity in goods sectors. The ad–valorem equivalent NTBs under the FTA
and the MFN scenario are obtained in the same regression as coefficients of a bilateral, time-variant FTA and a EU
dummy as exp(β/θ)− 1, where β is the mentioned coefficient. Missing elasticities for some sectors in Felbermayr
et al. (2017) have been proxied with the elasticities of similar sectors.
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C Additional tables and figures
Table C1: Country-level results
welfare effects prices effects nominal GDP
FTA MFN New FTA MFN New FTA MFN New
MFN MFN MFN
AUT -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
BEL -0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0
BGR -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
CYP -1.1 -1.4 -1.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
CZE -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4
DEU -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
DNK -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6
ESP -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3
EST -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
FIN -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
FRA -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5
GBR -2.1 -3.1 -2.8 0.3 0.7 0.1 -1.8 -2.4 -2.7
GBR -2.1 -3.1 -2.8 0.3 0.7 0.1 -1.8 -2.4 -2.7
GRC -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
HRV -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
HUN -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5
IRL -2.7 -3.9 -3.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 -2.3 -3.4 -3.1
ITA -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
LTU -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
LUX -3.1 -4.3 -4.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -3.8 -5.0 -5.0
LVA -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
MLT -5.1 -6.0 -6.0 -2.8 -2.7 -2.7 -7.8 -8.6 -8.6
NLD -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -1.0 -1.0
POL -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5
PRT -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
ROU -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
SVK -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -1.0
SVN -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
SWE -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: Welfare is defined as real household income. Changes in nominal GDP is aggregated from sector-level
value added by using sector value added shares in country’s total value added.
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Figure C1: UK tariffs on imports from EU27 countries
Sources and notes: See Figure 12.
Figure C2: EU27 countries tariffs on imports from UK
Sources and notes: See Figure 12.
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Figure C3: Country-level results - real exports
Sources: WIOD 2016, WTO-IDB database, ITC Market Access Map, Comtrade, Felbermayr et al. (2017) and
authors’ calculations.
Notes: Changes in total real exports and imports have been aggregated from changes in sector-level real bilateral
exports by using shares of corresponding nominal values. Nominal bilateral sector-level export changes have been
deflated with the respective price changes.
Figure C4: Country-level results - real imports
Sources and notes: See Figure C3.
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Tables




of which: final exports 0.68 0.73
GVC exports 0.95 0.93
IV 0.94 0.95
FV 0.66 0.72
Sources: WIOD 2016 and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table reports the absolute correlation coefficients between the effects of an increase of 40% across the
borders on welfare reported in the first column (and illustrated in Figure 5) for the year 2000 and 2014.
Table 2: Changes in nominal bilateral trade in FTA, MFN and New MFN scenarios
Intermediates Final goods
EU27 UK RoW EU27 UK RoW
FTA scenario
EU27 -27.3 0.8 -28.2 -0.5
UK -31.4 0.6 -38.3 -0.2
RoW 2.1 7.4 -0.5 6.9
MFN scenario
EU27 -40.6 1.2 -43.9 -0.1
UK -45.5 0.1 -53.7 -1.1
RoW 1.7 10.7 -0.8 13.9
New MFN scenario
EU27 -39.1 1.1 -41.7 -0.2
UK -44.7 1.6 -52.6 0.7
RoW 1.8 11.3 -0.7 13.4
Sources: WIOD 2016, WTO-IDB database, ITC Market Access Map, Comtrade, Felbermayr et al. (2017) and
authors’ calculations.
Notes: percentage changes. Exporting country/area is reported in table’s row. Intermediate and final indicate
nominal trade in intermediate and final products, respectively. EU27 refers to EU countries, excluding the UK.
Corresponding real changes are broadly similar to the nominal changes reported in the table.
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Table 3: Aggregate effects of Brexit - Summary
EU27 UK
FTA MFN New MFN FTA MFN New MFN
Real exports -1.98 -2.64 -2.52 -13.33 -19.29 -17.99
Real imports -2.12 -2.91 -2.83 -15.86 -21.39 -19.04
Welfare -0.38 -0.56 -0.55 -2.12 -3.14 -2.76
Nominal GDP -0.36 -0.62 -0.57 -1.81 -2.43 -2.66
CPI 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.32 0.73 0.11
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: Changes in total real exports and imports have been aggregated from changes in sector-level real bilateral
trade by using shares of corresponding nominal values. Nominal bilateral sector-level trade changes have been
deflated with the respective price changes. Welfare is defined as real household income and GDP as the difference
between total nominal output and consumption of intermediate products.
Table 4: Sectoral effects for EU
new
Sectors FTA MFN MFN
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities -2.4 -2.8 -2.8
Other transport equipment -0.6 -2.6 -2.0
Other professional, scientific and technical activities -1.2 -2.2 -2.1
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products -1.0 -2.0 -2.4
Basic metals -0.9 -1.6 -1.4
Chemicals -1.2 -1.5 -1.6
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -0.7 -1.4 -1.4
Basic pharmaceutical products -1.0 -1.4 -1.5
Coke and refined petroleum -0.9 -1.3 -1.3
Computer, electronic and optical products -1.2 -1.2 -1.3
Sewerage; waste collection -0.7 -1.1 -1.1
Postal and courier activities -0.7 -1.1 -1.1
Publishing activities -0.7 -1.0 -1.0
Air transport -0.7 -1.0 -1.0
Electrical equipment -0.7 -1.0 -1.1
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding -0.7 -1.0 -1.0
Rubber and plastic products -0.6 -1.0 -1.1
Advertising and market research -0.7 -0.9 -0.9
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles -0.6 -0.9 -0.9
Education -0.6 -0.9 -0.9
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: The table reports the 20 most affected sectors in terms of percentage loss in nominal value added in the
MFN scenario.
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Table 5: Sectoral effects for UK
new
Sectors FTA MFN MFN
Basic metals -10.2 -17.3 -15.4
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities -11.3 -12.4 -12.2
Other professional, scientific and technical activities -5.7 -10.5 -10.4
Chemicals -7.6 -9.3 -11.1
Coke and refined petroleum -4.7 -7.6 -7.9
Electrical equipment -5.4 -7.6 -9.5
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles -4.7 -6.3 -6.3
Other transport equipment -1.6 -6.2 -4.0
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -3.2 -5.5 -5.4
Computer, electronic and optical products -4.2 -5.4 -6.0
Sewerage; waste collection -3.4 -5.2 -5.2
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products -2.4 -5.2 -10.4
Fishing and aquaculture -0.8 -4.6 -4.7
Motion picture, video and television programme production -2.6 -3.4 -3.4
Architectural and engineering activities -2.1 -3.3 -3.4
Postal and courier activities -2.4 -2.9 -3.1
Legal and accounting activities -2.1 -2.9 -3.0
Computer programming and information service activities -2.2 -2.8 -2.9
Warehousing and support activities for transportation -2.0 -2.8 -2.9
Administrative and support service activities -1.7 -2.8 -2.8
Sources: See Table 4.







Sources: See Table 2 and Wang et al. (2013).
Notes: Percentage of total exports. Pure bilateral trade (direct value added in exports) is the domestic value
added that is produced in the economy and finally consumed in the trade partner.
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Table 7: Changes in GVC-related trade
Exports through partner Exports through partner













Sources: See Table 2 and Wang et al. (2013).
Notes: Percentage of total exports. Exports through partner is the value added of exports which is originated




Figure 1: Trade openness in the last three decades
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
Notes: Trade openness is defined as the sum of nominal imports and exports divided by nominal GDP. Data for
the Emerging Economies aggregate are available from 1998 onwards only.
Figure 2: The evolution of the GVC network
Sources: WIOD (2016 release) and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each dot (node) in the picture represents a sector in a country. Colours distinguish countries. Gray lines
(edges) connecting the dots represent trade flows in intermediate inputs between sectors. To reduce complexity,
only nodes with betweenness centrality above 3000 and edges representing flows above 1 billion USD are shown.
For comparability, these criteria are applied to both figures.
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Figure 3: Global value chain participation over time
Source: UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database and authors’ calculations.
Notes: GVC participation is computed as the sum of foreign value added (upstream participation) and domestic
value added embedded in other countries exports (downstream participation), as share of the country/region total
exports. See Koopman et al. (2014), among others, for further details. GVC participation values for 2016-2018
are based on now-casting.
Figure 4: Harmful vs liberalising measures
Source: Global Trade Alert database.
Notes: The figure shows the number of trade interventions. Data are adjusted for reporting lags.
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Figure 5: Changes in aggregate trade and global value chain participation
Sources: WIOD (2016 release) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The figure shows trade measures as share of total production for each country in the sample.
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Figure 6: Welfare effects of a 40% increase in trade costs - 2000 vs 2014
Sources: WIOD (2016 release) and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The figure shows the welfare effects of a 40% increase in trade costs between all countries and all sectors.
Figure 7: Price effects in 2014 - 10% vs 40% increase in trade costs
Sources: WIOD (2016 release) and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The figure shows the effects on consumer prices (CPI) of a 10% and 40% increase in trade costs between
all countries and all sectors calculated using input-output tables for 2014.
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Figure 8: Bilateral trade between the EU27 and the UK
Sources: WIOD 2016 Release, Wang et al. (2013) and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Shares of total nominal trade, for the EU27 this include intra-block and extra-block flows. Direct trade
consists of flows that are absorbed by the destination country for final consumption. GVC trade includes value
added sourced by third countries and trade flows redirected back or to third countries.
Figure 9: EU27 countries’ bilateral trade with the UK
Sources and notes: see Figure 8.
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Figure 10: 20 most exposed EU27 sectors to trade with the UK
Sources: see Figure 8.
Notes: share of sectors’ total nominal trade. Sectors are defined according to the ISIC Rev. 4 classification. Total
number of sectors is 56.
Figure 11: 20 most exposed UK sectors to trade with the rest of the EU
Sources and notes: see Figure 8.
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Figure 12: UK tariffs on imports from EU27 by sector
Sources: Calculation on WTO-IDB database, ITC Market Access Map and Comtrade.
Notes: percentage tariff on imports. The figure shows sectors defined according to the ISIC Rev.4 classification
and ordered by using sector value added shares in UK’s total value added. Total number of sectors for goods is
22.
Figure 13: EU27 tariffs on imports from UK by sector
Sources and notes: See Figure 12. Sectors are ordered by using sector value added shares in EU’s total value
added
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Figure 14: Country-level results - welfare
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: Welfare is defined as real household income.
Figure 15: Country-level results - nominal GDP
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: Changes in nominal GDP is aggregated from sector-level value added by using sector value added shares
in country’s total value added.
Figure 16: Country-level results - Consumer Price Index
Sources: See Table 2.
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Figure 17: The role of GVCs in the model - MFN scenario
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: Welfare is defined as real household income. "GVCs and multi-sector" corresponds to the full model
results for the MFN scenario reported in Figure C1. "GVCs and one sector" reports the results a model in which
both intermediate and final trade flows have been aggregated to country level and weighted averages for the tariff
changes and the elasticities have been used. "no GVCs and multi-sector" reports the results of a model in which
bilateral intermediate entries have been attributed to bilateral final entries.
Figure 18: Sensitivity analysis - MFN scenario
Sources: See Table 2.
Notes: "ifo" refers to results of the model in this note obtained by using the elasticities by Felbermayr et al.
(2017); "ifo with theta=5" uses the same NTBs, but trade elasticities equal to 5 for all sectors. "Dhingra et al.
(2017)" uses tariff elasticities and NTBs utilized in Dhingra et al. (2017).
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